As expected, individual differences in life satisfaction predicted the magnitude of this priming effect (Studies 1 & 2), which appeared to be unique to judgments of the self's emotions (Study 3). The results indicate that happy, relative to less happy, individuals organize information concerning their positive emotions in a qualitatively different and tighter semantic manner.
Keywords : life satisfaction; emotion; happiness; affect; judgment processes; priming There are a variety of perspectives on the locus and cause of individual differences in subjective well-being, including genes (Tellegen et al., 1988) , hormones (e.g., Dabbs, 2000) , motives (e.g., Emmons & McAdams, 1991) , social comparison processes (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997) , and mood regulation processes (e.g., Wood, Heimpel, & Michela, 2003) . Research within our lab, however, has started with the observation that personality traits, as typically measured, seem to ask for generalized beliefs about the self (Robinson & Clore, 2002a; Robinson & Neighbors, in press; Robinson, Solberg, Vargas, & Tamir, 2003) . Generalized beliefs about the self are not particularly tied to momentary experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002b; Robinson, Vargas, & Crawford, 2003) but are instead likely stored as facts, such as "Africa is a continent" (Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Robinson & Neighbors, in press) .
Personality Traits as a Belief System
Viewing personality traits as a belief system has important consequences for understanding the self as well as emotion judgment processes (Epstein, 1973; Robinson & Clore, 2002a; Robinson, Solberg, et al., 2003) . In particular, it is critical to distinguish feelings themselves, which are experiential, nonverbal, and transitory, from trait emotion judgments, which likely reflect semantic, verbal, and stable sources of self-knowledge. That is, we may feel different emotions than we believe we feel! Some support for this distinction comes from studies examining dissociations between momentary feelings versus memory for those feelings (for a review, see Robinson & Clore, 2002a) . Such dissociations have implications for a wide variety of socially important individual differences. For example, the tendency for women to report more intense emotions than men appears somewhat particular to retrospective reporting formats (Barrett, Robin, Pietromonaco, & Eyssell, 1998) . Online emotion judgments, by contrast, typically exhibit relatively minimal sex differences (Barrett et al., 1998; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Robinson & Clore, 2002a; Shields, 1991) . Robinson and Clore (2002a) used the distinction between feelings versus beliefs about feelings to understand a variety of other retrospective biases in emotion judgment such as those related to culture (Oishi, 2002) , self-esteem (Christensen, Wood, & Barrett, 2003) , and neuroticism (Barrett, 1997) .
Since the initial review by Robinson and Clore (2002a) , we have conducted a variety of additional studies that are consistent with the idea that traits tap beliefs about the self's emotions rather than feelings themselves (e.g., Robinson & Clore, 2002b; Robinson, Solberg, et al., 2003; Tamir, Robinson, & Clore, 2002) . In summarizing this research somewhat generally, two points seem especially evident. First, it seems critical to distinguish trait and state judgments of emotion; these likely reflect fundamentally different sources of self-knowledge. Second, it appears profitable to view personality traits in terms of beliefs about the self that are generalized in nature but nevertheless consequential for processing and judgment under certain conditions. In the present work, we sought to extend this perspective. Specifically, we took advantage of the idea that generalized sources of knowledge are tightly structured and thereby exhibit priming within semantic judgment tasks (Robinson & Clore, 2002b; Tulving, 1984) .
Personality and Priming
When people comprehend events, they do so by activating relevant material from long-term memory. For example, the word Tuesday in and of itself would have little meaning without support from long-term knowledge related to the segmentation of time and other days of the week. Similarly, when a person decides that he or she is generally happy to a certain extent, he or she has to activate knowledge related to the self as well as to the nature of emotions (Kihlstrom, Mulvaney, Tobias, & Tobis, 2000) . Although long-term memories are essential in providing the necessary context to make any meaningful (rather than random) semantic judgment, such supporting knowledge is rarely, if ever, in the foreground of consciousness (James, 1890; Robinson & Neighbors, in press ). However, the retrieval of long-term memories leaves a trace of activation that lingers for some time. Therefore, by examining the residual effects of one judgment on speed to make the next judgment, one can study the organization of semantic memory. This, of course, is the idea behind semantic priming paradigms (for a particularly good overview, see .
We have argued that individuals differ in their emotion-related semantic knowledge and that such differences are captured to some extent by trait self-reports (Robinson & Clore, 2002a) . Individual differences in trait happiness can, in other words, be viewed as a belief system related to the self's experience of happiness. Although prior results within our lab are consistent with this idea (e.g., Robinson, Solberg, et al., 2003) , they do not, in themselves, establish the hypothesized mediating processes in semantic memory.
In particular, a belief system is an organized structure of semantic knowledge (Joordens & Becker, 1997; Neely, 1991; Tulving, 1984) . If personality traits do indeed reflect emotion-related beliefs about the self (Robinson & Clore, 2002a) , it seems critical to show that such traits are associated with systematic variations in semantic priming when judging the emotions of the self. Positive evidence for this contention would establish, more directly than in prior studies, the usefulness of viewing traits (e.g., life satisfaction) in terms of beliefs about the self's emotions (e.g., one's typical experiences of happiness).
Rationale for Current Studies
To assess individual differences in beliefs about happiness, we used the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) . The scale is designed to measure the relatively cognitive component of subjective well-being termed life satisfaction (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999) . However, scores on it correlate fairly high with measures of dispositional positive and negative affect (Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996) . Consistent with the notion that the scale measures global beliefs concerning one's happiness, there is recent evidence showing that satisfaction with life scores bias judgments of domain satisfaction (e.g., education) relative to the more specific criteria (e.g., teachers, textbooks) on which such judgments should be based (Oishi & Diener, 2001) . There is related evidence showing that the average life satisfaction of nations predicts similar discrepancies with respect to domain satisfaction judgments (Diener, Napa Scollon, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Suh, 2000) . The authors (Diener et al., 2000; Oishi & Diener, 2001) have concluded that the SWLS measures global beliefs about happiness that may or may not correspond closely with satisfaction with the episodic facts of one's life. We reasoned that global beliefs are likely stored in semantic memory in a manner that can be tapped by a semantic priming task.
To examine how people organize their knowledge related to positive and negative emotions, we used a sequential priming paradigm. The paradigm relies on examining latencies to make a particular type of judgment (e.g., related to one's positive affect) as a function of the type of information presented on the previous trial. We have used this paradigm in prior research (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2004b; Robinson & Clore, 2002b) . The paradigm is useful for examining semantic memory structures for a number of reasons. First, because there is no obvious pairing of primes and targets, there is little to no influence from strategic mechanisms related to attempts to predict prime-target pairings . Second, because primes are actually targets as well, one insures that the primes activate semantic Robinson, Kirkeby / LIFE SATISFACTION AND EMOTION JUDGMENT PRIMING 1135 memory (Joordens & Becker, 1997) . Third, the response-stimulus asynchronicity can be quite short (here, 100 ms) thus rendering it very sensitive to spreading activation processes (de Mornay Davies, 1998).
1
In evaluating the sequential judgment paradigm, it may be useful to compare it to affective priming paradigms as typically constructed and used (for reviews, see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003) . In such paradigms, a positive (e.g., bunny) or negative (e.g., skunk) prime word is typically flashed on the screen for 200 ms (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) . After a 100 ms blank interval, another positive (e.g., perfect) or negative (e.g., terrible) word is presented, and participants are told to evaluate the target word (e.g., 1 = unpleasant; 9 = pleasant). Despite the short duration of the affective prime, and the fact that participants were told they could ignore this prime, participants frequently cannot do so as indicated by their target evaluation latencies. Instead, congruent (i.e., positive-positive or negative-negative) relative to incongruent (i.e., negative-positive or positive-negative) prime-target pairings are typically faster, although there are important boundary conditions for this effect (Klauer & Musch, 2003; Storbeck & Robinson, 2004) .
Within the present studies, we were also interested in affective priming effects defined as faster target judgments when the valence of prime and target matched (i.e., positive-positive or negative-negative) rather than mismatched (i.e., negative-positive or positive-negative) in valence. However, the current paradigm was designed to examine the semantic organization of the self's emotional knowledge rather than the minimal conditions necessary for producing affective priming; therefore, our procedure differed from typical affective priming procedures (Klauer & Musch, 2003) in at least two ways. First, the present paradigm requires the individual to make relatively differentiated judgments concerning their emotions; by contrast, typical affective priming procedures require only dichotomous categorizations (e.g., positive vs. negative). The difference in task procedures was intentional in that it closely approximates how individuals make emotion judgments within the personality literature, and we wanted to make contact with this literature.
Second, affective priming procedures often involve the brief presentation of affective primes immediately followed by targets to be categorized. Such procedures do not insure that the self-concept is activated, nor do they insure that affect is activated (Niedenthal, Rohmann, & Dalle, 2003; Storbeck & Robinson, 2004) . Such priming procedures may therefore be a poor way to examine individual differences in semantic beliefs about the self in that there is no guarantee that such taskirrelevant primes actually make contact with affective belief structures (Banse, 2003; Robinson & Neighbors, in press ). Semantic encoding procedures, particular to the self-concept, thus best insure that affective primes do indeed contact self-structures within semantic memory (Joordens & Becker, 1997) .
In essence, then, one can contrast the present paradigm with typical priming procedures by noting that our goals were different from those examined within affective priming studies. We wanted to examine the organization of self-relevant emotion knowledge rather than the consequences of incidental exposure to affective primes. It is our opinion that the present procedures are well suited to this purpose (Robinson & Neighbors, in press) .
In the present studies, we asked participants to judge the extent to which they tend to experience different positive and negative emotions. Because we included an equal number of positive and negative emotion terms and because trials involved random selection, this makes it equally likely that a positive emotion term would be preceded by either a positive or negative emotion term on the previous trial. Unbeknownst to participants, we were interested in order effects across trials. Of particular interest, we could examine the speed to make a positive emotion judgment as a function of the valence of the previous trial (either positive or negative). An organized and interconnected semantic memory structure should result in faster judgments when two positive emotions occur in a consecutive sequence relative to a negativepositive prime-target sequence.
On the basis of the idea that life satisfaction taps beliefs about one's own happiness, we expected participants higher in life satisfaction to exhibit stronger priming effects when judging positive emotion targets. This would suggest a tighter, more interconnected semantic knowledge structure related to one's positive emotions among those higher in this trait-like construct. Related to judgments of negative emotion targets, we were somewhat less sure. Most people, including those lower in life satisfaction, experience positive emotion states more frequently than negative emotion states (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 1991; Watson, 2000) . Because the frequency of an event is a major predictor of the likelihood of forming tighter associations in semantic memory (Smith, 1998) , it seems likely that, for almost everyone, positive emotion knowledge would be more organized and interconnected than negative emotion knowledge (for related evidence, see Isen & Daubman, 1984; Showers, 1992) . It is also true that life satisfaction scores correlate more highly with positive affect judgments than with negative affect judgments (Lucas et al., 1996) . This again suggests that the moderating effects of life satisfaction might be more pronounced with respect to positive emotion targets. However, to the extent that life satisfaction does 1136 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN moderate the pattern of priming involving negative emotion targets, we predicted that individuals low in life satisfaction would exhibit more priming. Our particular hypotheses related to priming rather than to main effects on target judgment latencies. In this connection, in prior research on categorization (e.g., Robinson, 2004) and emotion judgment latencies (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2004a) , we have rarely found significant correlations between traits and target reaction times. This encourages us to think of traits and target reaction times as somewhat independent manifestations of personality (Robinson, 2004) . Aside from theoretical reasons for expecting dissociations (e.g., as discussed in MacLeod, 1993) , it is also true that main effects on reaction time are relatively uninformative from a trait perspective precisely because of uncontrolled sources of variance related to motivation, elaborative processing, familiarity with the English language, and fluid intelligence, all of which influence reaction time performance (Sanders, 1998) . However, within-subject priming effects control for all of these extraneous sources of individual differences precisely because each participant serves as his or her own statistical control (Robinson & Neighbors, in press ). For these reasons, hypotheses concerning the life satisfaction measure were specific to priming effects rather than target latencies. 
Method
Participants. Sixty-nine undergraduate students from North Dakota State University participated in return for extra credit.
Overview of procedures. Participants completed the study in small group sessions of 2 to 6 at a time. Each was seated before a personal computer. They performed the sequential judgment task described below and then reported on their life satisfaction.
Sequential judgment task. Stimuli for the task were selected from prior studies examining emotion words, including studies by Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O'Connor (1987) ; Storm and Storm (1987); and Clore, Ortony, and Foss (1987) . Based on this literature review, we were able to compile a list of 30 positive emotion terms (e.g., joy) and 30 negative emotion terms (e.g., sadness). The emotion terms were clearly valenced in nature and precluded words like surprise, arousal, and confusion, which are somewhat ambiguous as indicators of emotion (Clore et al., 1987) . 2 Participants were asked to judge the extent to which they generally tend to feel each of the 60 emotion terms. We used the in general timeframe precisely because we wanted to examine semantic emotion knowledge rather than emotion knowledge that is more state specific (Robinson & Clore, 2002b) . Trials proceeded as follows. First, there was a 100 ms blank interval (i.e., the response-stimulus asynchronicity). Second, a particular emotion term (e.g., angry) appeared on the screen, centered both vertically and horizontally. Third, the participant determined the extent to which he or she generally tends to experience the emotion in question by choosing from among a range of choices along a 5-point intensity scale (1 = none; 5 = an extreme amount). Fourth, the participant pressed the spacebar when he or she was ready to make a rating. The bulk of the judgment time related to this spacebar press (see Robinson & Clore, 2002b , for further details on this method). Fifth, the emotion term disappeared from the screen and the participant made the relevant rating. The completion of the rating started the next trial. Judgment time was operationalized as the time to press the spacebar plus the time to make the relevant rating.
To insure an adequate number of trials, we presented each emotion term twice. The 60 emotion terms were presented in one random order the first time and then in a different random order the second time. The computer program also generated different random orders for each participant. The total number of trials was 120. On average, the stimulus presentation procedures resulted in 30 positive trials that were preceded by positive trials, 30 positive trials that were preceded by negative trials, and 30 trials of each of the two (i.e., positivenegative and negative-negative) remaining prime-target types.
Satisfaction with life. Participants reported on their satisfaction with life using the SWLS (Diener et al., 1985) . The scale has extensive evidence related to its reliability and validity (Pavot & Diener, 1993) . In the present study, Cronbach's alpha was .87.
Results
The full Prime Valence × Target Valence design is not appropriate for examining trait-related effects, which were hypothesized to be valence specific. To investigate valence-specific priming effects, we performed two analyses, one for positive emotion targets and one for negative emotion targets. Both designs involved a two-level within-subject variable of prime valence (positive vs. negative) in combination with individual differences in life satisfaction. We were able to treat the individual difference variable in a continuous z-scored fashion by using the general linear model (GLM) procedures of the Statistical Analysis System (SAS).
We expected to find a Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction in the context of positive emotion judgments. This expectation was born out by the data. Specifically, in the prediction of latencies pertaining to The lack of a main effect for life satisfaction, even within the context of positive target judgments, is quite consistent with prior results from our laboratory (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2004a; Robinson, 2004) . Traits rarely predict trait-relevant judgment latencies in any type of main effect manner. This is counter to the simple, but incorrect, equation of traits with chronic accessibility processes, at least as related to reaction time (Robinson, 2004; Robinson & Neighbors, in press; .
Of more importance, the Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction indicated that the strength of the priming effect for positive emotion targets varied significantly by life satisfaction. We hypothesized that participants higher in life satisfaction would show a more pronounced priming effect thereby indicating a tighter and more interconnected knowledge structure related to their positive emotions. To examine this hypothesis, we calculated estimated means for those low (-1 SD) versus high (+1 SD) in life satisfaction for each of the two primetarget combinations. The results, shown in Figure 1 , support our hypothesis in indicating that the priming effect for positive emotion targets was more pronounced for those higher in life satisfaction. To further probe the interaction, we performed a median split on life satisfaction scores and then ran separate one-way ANOVAs for those low and high in life satisfaction. The priming effect was only marginally significant among individuals low in life satisfaction, F(1, 29) = 3.18, p = .085, and much more pronounced among individuals high in life satisfaction, F(1, 30) = 29.02, p = .000.
In a second analysis, we focused on latencies for negative emotion targets. In this analysis, there was no main effect for prime valence, F(1, 68) = 2.70, p = .105. In addition, there was no main effect for life satisfaction, F < 1, and there was no Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction, F < 1. Thus, individual differences in life satisfaction appear to be more closely related to positive emotion knowledge than to negative emotion knowledge. 
Discussion
Based on our personality-as-belief theoretical framework (Robinson & Clore, 2002a) , we sought to focus on individual differences in life satisfaction and their association with priming effects in emotion judgments. The results suggest a couple of things. First, individual differences in life satisfaction may be more closely associated with positive emotion knowledge than with negative emotion knowledge in that there was a Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction within the context of positive targets but not negative targets. Second, such results cannot be explained in terms of individual differences in the compartmentalization of positive and negative selfknowledge (Showers, 1992) in that the moderating effects for life satisfaction were specific to positive emotion targets.
Third, of most importance, an interaction with life satisfaction supported our hypotheses. Among participants low in life satisfaction, judgments involving positive emotion targets were somewhat equally fast when they followed positive versus negative emotion primes. Such individuals appear to lack strong associations in memory related to their positive emotions. However, among participants high in life satisfaction, the same positive emotion judgments were quite a bit faster when the prime trial also involved a positive (vs. negative) emotion prime. In sum, the happy person appears to have stronger associations between different positive emotions, whereas the unhappy person appears to lack such a coherent belief structure. The results were therefore successful in mapping individual differences in happiness onto individual differences in the organization of semantic knowledge related to the self's positive emotions. We sought to conceptually replicate such results within a second study. Aside from replication concerns, Study 2 also examines priming effects involving a slightly different timeframe. Participants in Study 2 reported on their emotions over the past few years rather than in general. Although this timeframe is specific and circumscribed (e.g., it does not include emotions experienced 5 years ago), we expected the same pattern of findings in the study. This is because such a timeframe is too wide and retrospective to support an episodic retrieval strategy (for relevant evidence on this point, see Robinson & Clore, 2002b) . Under such reporting circumstances, we have shown that people default to a belief-based or semantic reporting strategy (Robinson & Clore, 2002b; Robinson, Solberg, et al., 2003) . Therefore, we expected to replicate Study 1 results, again suggesting the operation of semantic memory networks.
Method
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students from the North Dakota State University participated in return for extra credit.
Procedure. The procedure for Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1 except for instructions that stated the timeframe (i.e., last few years). The Cronbach's alpha for the SWLS was .92.
Results
Judgment latencies were log transformed, and outliers were replaced exactly as in Study 1. Life satisfaction scores were z scored prior to the following analyses. We sought to examine how individual differences in life satisfaction moderated priming effects involving emotion judgments. Because we hypothesized that such moderating effects would be valence specific, we conducted two analyses, one involving positive emotion targets and one involving negative emotion targets. Both designs involved prime valence (positive vs. negative) in combination with z-scored life satisfaction using the GLM procedures of SAS.
A first analysis focused on judgment latencies for positive emotion targets. As in Study 1, there was no main effect for life satisfaction, F(1, 19) = 1.16, p = .263. Thus, the present findings cannot be understood in terms of chronic accessibility processes, which would predict a main effect here. By contrast, there was a main effect for prime valence, F(1, 19) = 29.87, p = .000, such that positive emotion targets were judged faster following positive emotion primes (M = 1,603 ms) versus negative emotion primes (M = 1,792 ms).
Of more importance, there was a Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction, F(1, 19) = 4.80, p = .042, as in Study 1. Estimated means were calculated as in Study 1. These means, displayed in Figure 2 , indicate that priming effects were stronger among participants higher in life satisfaction. As in Study 1, we then performed a median split on life satisfaction scores. The priming effect was significant for those low in life satisfaction, F(1, 9) = 6.17, p = .035, as well as for those high in life satisfaction, F(1, 9) = 29.96, p = .001.
We next examined negative emotion judgments. Prime valence was a within-subject factor, whereas life satisfaction represented a between-subjects source of variance. There was no main effect for life satisfaction, F < 1. However, unlike Study 1, there was a main effect for prime valence, F(1, 19) = 6.37, p = .021. In Study 2, but not Study 1, negative emotion targets were judged faster when they followed negative emotion primes (M = 1,637 ms) relative to positive emotion primes (M = 1,707 ms).
Finally, there was a significant Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction with respect to negative emotion target latencies, F(1, 19) = 9.52, p = .006. Estimated means, reported in Figure 3 , indicate that priming effects for negative emotion targets were exclusive to participants low in satisfaction with life. The latter observations were supported by separate one-way ANOVAs examining the effects of prime valence at a given level of life satisfaction (low or high). Participants low in life satisfaction showed a significant priming effect for negative emotion targets, F(1, 9) = 10.28, p = .011, whereas participants high in life satisfaction did not, F < 1.
4
Discussion Study 2 replicated Study 1. We again found a significant Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction with respect to positive target latencies. Estimated means, reported in Figure 2 , indicate that the pattern was parallel to Study 1. Specifically, people low in life satisfaction displayed smaller priming effects, whereas people high in life satisfaction displayed larger priming effects. Such results reaffirm the relation between life satisfaction and the organization of semantic knowledge related to the self's positive emotions. Happy, relative to unhappy, people appear to have a tighter, more interconnected belief system related to their experience of positive emotions.
In Study 2, we also found a significant priming effect for negative emotion targets thus suggesting that there is something like a negative self-schema that the paradigm is capable of assessing. Moreover, this priming effect involving negative emotion targets was significant for those low in life satisfaction but was not significant for those high in life satisfaction. In sum, Study 2 provides an intriguing glimpse into the minds of relatively happy and less happy people. The lower a person's life satisfaction, the stronger the priming effects were for negative targets
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and the weaker the priming effects were for positive targets. By contrast, the higher a person's life satisfaction, the stronger the priming effects were for positive targets and the weaker the priming effects were for negative targets. Such a double dissociation provides powerful evidence for the claim that life satisfaction scores tap semantic beliefs about the self's emotions. It is worth reiterating that such effects cannot be understood in terms of compartmentalized self-concepts (Showers, 1992) , which would predict similar rather than divergent patterns for positive and negative emotion targets. Here, by contrast, the findings were quite distinct for positive and negative targets.
Although Studies 1 and 2 replicated each other in many respects, it is nevertheless useful to point out the anomalies with respect to negative emotion targets. There was a significant Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction in Study 2 but not in Study 1. It is possible that the distinct timeframes-in general versus last few yearsmight have been involved in the distinct results. Some support for this idea comes from data presented in Robinson and Clore (2002b) . They examined the impact of timeframe width on rating means and found that the normative tendency to report more positive than negative affect was particular to the in general frame, even relative to the last few years frame. It could be that any specific timeframe, even when relatively long (e.g., last few years), engenders a more realistic appraisal process including both positive and negative emotions of the self. By contrast, the timeframe in general may be particularly vague and therefore particularly likely to encourage self-enhancement tendencies in beliefs about the self. Given these thoughts, it would be interesting to make a more systematic comparison of timeframes as Robinson and Clore (2002b) did in their study.
Finally, it is worth saying something about the possibility of order effects in Studies 1 and 2. In both studies, the emotion judgment task preceded the collection of life satisfaction data. The order of the tasks was guided by the assumption that cognitive processes are quite malleable (Blair, 2002; Robinson & Neighbors, in press) , and therefore, it makes sense to assess them prior to the collection of other variables. By contrast, we know of no data that show that SWLS scores can be altered by performing cognitive tasks, and SWLS scores are also quite stable (Eid & Diener, 2004; Pavot & Diener, 1993) . Moreover, it is difficult to see how the present order of measures could have facilitated the Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interactions, particularly because order was held constant across persons. All this said, it would be desirable to replicate the present interactive pattern with a temporal lag between the collection of implicit (i.e., priming) and explicit (i.e., life satisfaction) measures.
STUDY 3
Study 3 had a relatively constrained, although nevertheless potentially important, purpose. In Studies 1 and 2, we made the assumption that the Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interactions were due to accessed selfknowledge. However, given that no prior study has examined emotion judgments for nonself targets, we cannot rule out the possibility that the results, as so far reported, could be due to individual differences in positive emotion knowledge in general rather than with respect to the self. To disambiguate these possibilities, we conducted a third study. The procedures for this study-including stimuli, the trial sequence, and the measurement of life satisfaction-were identical to the prior studies. However, within Study 3, participants were asked to report on their best friend's emotions. The familiarity of this target should insure that the person has a belief system (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; Prentice, 1990) . Nevertheless, the fact that the person is distinct from the self renders it likely that the participant will access a distinct source of semantic emotion knowledge, specifically as related to one's best friend rather than the self. To the extent that the results reported in Studies 1 and 2 pertain to positive emotion knowledge regardless of the target person involved, we would expect a similar Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction in Study 3. However, to the extent that the results reported in Studies 1 and 2 pertain to the self-concept, we would expect no Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction in Study 3.
Method
Participants. Fifteen undergraduate students from North Dakota State University participated in return for extra credit.
Procedure. The procedures for Study 2 were identical to prior studies except that participants were asked to judge the generalized emotions of their best friend. Prior to the task, they were asked to pick a particular best friend. Subsequently, they performed the emotion judgment task also used in the prior studies. Life satisfaction was measured after the emotion judgment task as in prior studies. Life satisfaction was measured in terms of the SWLS (alpha = .90) as in prior studies.
Results
We analyzed the data in a manner directly comparable to prior studies. Specifically, we first z scored life satisfaction. We log transformed judgment times and then replaced outliers (2.5 SDs below and above the grand latency mean). Subsequent to this, we conducted two analyses, one involving positive emotion targets and one involving negative emotion targets. We used the GLM procedures of SAS as in prior studies.
With respect to positive emotion targets, there was no main effect for life satisfaction, F(1, 14) = 2.18, p = .164. There was a significant effect for prime valence, F(1, 14) = 13.12, p = .003, consistent in direction with prior studies (Ms = 1,785 and 2,004 ms for positive and negative primes, respectively). However, there was no Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction, F < 1. The lack of any hint of an interaction suggests that the results reported in Studies 1 and 2 are unique to self-knowledge.
With respect to negative emotion targets, there was no main effect for life satisfaction, F(1, 14) = 1.27, p = .281.
There was a marginal main effect for prime valence, F (1, 14) = 3.18, p = .098 (Ms = 1,858 and 1,895 ms for negative and positive primes, respectively). However, there was no Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction, F(1, 14) = 2.44, p = .143.
Discussion
In a third study, our primary interest was in whether the Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interactions reported in Studies 1 and 2 pertain to self-knowledge in particular or to emotion knowledge in general. To examine these alternative possibilities, we asked participants in Study 3 to report on the emotions of their best friend. The timeframe was identical to Study 1, as were the stimuli and procedures. Also, one may reasonably assume that people know enough about their best friend to support emotion-related beliefs concerning the friend. In support of the latter point, we found that positivepositive emotion judgments were faster than negativepositive emotion judgments just as in the prior studies (here, F > 10). Although there was a Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction in Study 1, F > 7, and Study 2, F > 4.5, there was no hint of such an interaction in Study 3, F < 1. It therefore appears that the interactions reported in Studies 1 and 2 are specific to selfknowledge.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Summary of Findings
In Studies 1 and 2, we found that individual differences in life satisfaction were associated with the magnitude of priming effects involving the self's positive emotions. Consistent with the idea that individuals high (vs. low) in life satisfaction have developed tighter, more interconnected semantic knowledge concerning their positive emotions, such individuals indeed benefited more from two positive emotion trials in a row relative to individuals low in life satisfaction. Indeed, in Study 1, the priming effect for positive emotion targets was significant for individuals high in life satisfaction but not for individuals low in life satisfaction. Study 2, but not Study 1, also found that priming effects involving negative emotion targets were larger for individuals low in life satisfaction thereby suggesting that relatively unhappy people may sometimes develop more interconnected semantic knowledge concerning their negative emotions.
Caveats and Questions
The findings, although consistent with our theoretical framework (Robinson & Clore, 2002a) , also raise some questions concerning the effects reported here. We have been assuming that Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interactions would only occur in the context of Robinson, Kirkeby / LIFE SATISFACTION AND EMOTION JUDGMENT PRIMING 1141 judging one's emotions over relatively long timeframes (i.e., in general in Study 1 and in the past few years in Study 2). Such a prediction is consistent with the idea that people use semantic emotion knowledge when judging the self's emotions over long, but not short, timeframes (Robinson & Clore, 2002a , 2002b . However, because we did not conduct a study involving short timeframes, we cannot state with certainty that the present judgment effects are particular to longer timeframes (although some recent pilot data do suggest this; see Robinson & Kirkeby, 2004) . Another legitimate question is whether the priming effects reported here are specific to self-knowledge. They may instead be consistent with emotion knowledge regardless of the target of judgment (i.e., self or other). In Study 3, we investigated emotion judgments concerning one's best friend. Although people develop relatively stable beliefs about their friend's emotions (Fuhrman & Funder, 1995; Prentice, 1990) , we viewed it unlikely that these sorts of beliefs about another person would systematically relate to one's satisfaction with one's own life. Indeed, there was no hint of a Life Satisfaction × Prime Valence interaction in the context of positive target judgments, which were associated with such interactions in the prior studies. Therefore, it appears that the findings reported here relate to self-knowledge specifically rather than to emotion knowledge in general.
We should finally reiterate that our interests related to the process of emotion judgments, which is why we asked participants to make emotion ratings, as in the personality/emotion literature. From this perspective, the present findings help to elucidate the knowledge sources contributing to such judgments. It is an open question whether other priming procedures would replicate the present findings in all details. For example, would life satisfaction moderate the strength of affective priming effects based on paradigms more typical for that literature (for reviews, see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003) ? We suspect not. In particular, life satisfaction is plausibly and demonstrably related to beliefs concerning the self's emotions (e.g., Lucas et al., 1996) but not obviously related to automatic encoding tendencies (e.g., . Nevertheless, we cannot rule out such wider affective priming effects given the data reported here.
Life Satisfaction and Positive Emotion Knowledge
People high in life satisfaction believe that they experience positive affect more frequently and intensely and this belief has consequences (Robinson & Clore, 2002a) . One consequence is that individuals higher in life satisfaction are likely to report more satisfaction with life domains than can be justified on the basis of their satisfaction with the specific elements of those domains (Diener et al., 2000; Oishi & Diener, 2001) . A second likely consequence is that individuals higher in life satisfaction remember their experiences as being more positive than they actually were (Christensen et al., 2003; Oishi & Diener, 2001; Robinson & Clore, 2002a) .
A third important consequence is the one examined here. Life satisfaction represents not only a quantitative value along a self-report scale, but it also represents a qualitative difference in the organization of knowledge concerning the self. Moreover, it seems likely that the creation of a system of beliefs related to positive affect might actually create positive affect under certain conditions (Bruner, 1957; Higgins, 1996) . Although we did not provide direct evidence for this point here, there is evidence from Timothy Wilson's lab that activated beliefs about emotion bias emotional experience in a belief-consistent direction (Klaaren, Hodges, & Wilson, 1994; Wilson, Lisle, Kraft, & Wetzel, 1989) . Finally, consistent with the idea that beliefs about emotion lead to assimilation-related experiences, Robinson, Solberg, et al. (2003) demonstrated that even online reports of emotional experience can be biased by dispositional beliefs about one's emotions (see also Robinson & Oishi, 2004) . Therefore, beliefs about positive affect are likely to create their own reality, at least under certain circumstances.
We have demonstrated that beliefs about emotion are not inert but, rather, can be activated thereby influencing subsequent processing. It is intriguing to speculate that priming paradigms such as the one examined here might reveal important facts about an individual and potentially serve as implicit measures of personality (Robinson & Neighbors, in press ). For example, we might expect differences in the priming of positive and negative emotion judgments to predict the likelihood of experiencing positive affect in daily life, perhaps independently of the traits associated with subjective wellbeing Robinson, Vargas, Tamir, & Solberg, 2004) . Of course, we have no direct evidence for this point, but it stands to reason that life satisfaction is built on the cognitive and affective processing tendencies that differ between individuals (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; .
Conclusions
Three studies sought to validate predictions of the trait-equals-belief model (Robinson & Clore, 2002a) . If individual differences in global happiness reflect beliefs about the self's emotions (Oishi & Diener, 2001 ), above and beyond one's episodic experience of positive and negative emotions (Robinson, Solberg, et al., 2003) , then those higher (vs. lower) in life satisfaction may have tighter and more interconnected beliefs concerning 1142 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN their positive emotions. To investigate this idea, we developed an emotion-judgment paradigm to examine priming effects involving one's positive and negative emotions. As expected, two studies found that individuals higher (vs. lower) in life satisfaction exhibited more priming when judging their experience of positive emotions. Results from a third study suggested that such effects may be limited to self-knowledge. Overall, the findings encourage the trait-equals-belief model in the context of life satisfaction and knowledge concerning the self's positive emotions.
NOTES
